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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AMENDMENTS-VALIDITY OF RATIFICATION BY A STATE WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY
REJECTED.
On March 24, 1926, the General Assembly of Kentucky adopted a
resolution" rejecting the so-called Child Labor Amendment to the Fed2
eral Constitution, which had been proposed to the several states by
the Sixty-Eighth Congress of the United States on June 2, 1924. On
June 13, 1937, the Kentucky Assembly adopted a resolution! purporting to ratify the proposed Child Labor Amendment. At that time,
more than one-fourth of the states, including Kentucky, had affirmatively rejected the proposed amendment. In a suit to enjoin the certification of copies of the resolution to the Secretary of State of the
United States, the lower court sustained a demurrer to the petition.
H-ed-Reversed. Although the governor had already certified the
action of the legislature to the Secretary of State of the United States,
the petitioners are entitled to relief by way of a declaration of rights
under the local Declaratory Judgments Law.' The resolution in question is void because the state had exhausted its right to act on the
proposed amendment by rejecting it previously; the right of the
several states to ratify the proposed amendment had been exhausted
by rejection of the amendment by more than one-fourth of the states;
and because three-fourths of the states failed to ratify it within a
5
reasonable time.
It is believed that the Kentucky Court's ruling that a rejection
of a proposed amendment is fatal to the validity of a later purported
ratification, is not warranted by history, reason, or authority. It would
seem that since the constitutional power of ratification is not qualified
by any mention of the effect of a previous rejection, the action of one
state legislative session in rejecting a proposed amendment may not
prevent the further exercise of the federal power expressly conferred
6
upon that body. The Kansas Court so held," such has been the view
ISenate Resolution No. 12, Acts 1926, c. 345.
243 Stat. 670.
Acts Fourth Special Session 1936-37, c. 30.
4Kentucky Codes Ann. (Carroll, 1927), Secs. 637, et seq.
5
Wise, et al. v. Chandler, et al., 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024
(1937).
'Dodd, Amending the Constitution (1921), 30 Yale L. J. 321, 347:
"On the other hand, it is perhaps clear that a state legislature has a
continuing power of ratification until an amendment is adopted, or
until such a long period has elapsed that a sort of statute of limitations may be said to have run against any power to ratify the proposal."
Coleman, et al. v. Miller, et al., - Kan. -, 71 P. (2d) 518, 524
(1937): "It is generally agreed by lawyers, statesmen, and publicists
who have debated this question, that a State Legislature which has
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of a number of respectable writers," and such is the tenor of historical
precedent.' "Very often, the effect of history is to make the path of
1
logic clear." ' The State of West Virginia first rejected and later ratified the proposed Nineteenth Amendment in the same session, and
contrary to the State rules of procedure. The Supreme Court of the
United States refused to invalidate the ratification," and stated in its
opinion that the West Virginia Legislature had the power to adopt
the resolution.22 Such language may well be advanced as at least a
strong Indication of the Supreme Court's view of the problem at hand.
Obviously once it is clear that a prior rejection cannot preclude a
subsequent valid ratification, the Kentucky Court's assertion that the
proposed amendment had been exhausted because of rejection by more
than one-fourth of the states, has no force. Conversely, if rejection by
more than one-fourth of the states can be shown not to exhaust the
proposed amendment, there would be difficulty in discovering how a
prior rejection can be held to preclude a subsequent valid ratification.
1
The Federal Constitution declares an amendment to be valid ".
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
states . . ." The Kentucky Court would reach the strange result that
should more than one-fourth of the states reject an amendment within
however short a time after its proposal, the power of ratification vested
in the remaining states would be thereby nullified, and an attempted
exercise thereof a vain and useless gesture. It is submitted that the
constitutional provision as it now stands manifests an attempt to
submit a proposed amendment for the action or inaction of all the
states, thus allowing it mature consideration by the country as a
rejected an amendment proposed by Congress may later reconsider its
action and give its approval, and that a ratification once given cannot
be withdrawn."
8Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution (1922), Sec. 20;
Dodd, Amending the Constitution (1921), 30 Yale L. J. 321, 347; Grinnell, Finality of State's Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment
(1925), 11 Am. B. A. J. 192; Jameson, Constitutional Conventions (4th
ed., 1887), 579, 625; Miller, Amendment of the Federal Constitution
(1926), 60 Am. L. Rev. 181, 184; Orfield, Procedure of Federal Amending Power (1930), 25 Ill. L. Rev. 418, 439; 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States (1929), 593; note (1937), 37 Col. L.
Rev. 1201; note (1937), 25 Geo. L. J. 671, 676; note (1937), 47 Yale
L. J. 148.
9Congress by joint resolution declared the Fourteenth Amendment
adopted, including North Carolina and South Carolina as ratifying
states although they had at first rejected it. 15 Stat. L. 709-710,
In the case of the Fifteenth Amendment, Ohio and New Jer(1868).
sey first rejected, then ratified. Those two states were included in
the list of ratifying states and constituted part of the number necessary for adoption. It should also be noted that North Carolina first
rejected and later ratified the Constitution itself; see Trenholme, The
Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina (1932),
180, 237.
" Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process", p. 51.
2Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922).
1 Id., at 137.
1Article V.
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whole, and not subjecting it to a possibility of an early death through
the hasty rejection by only thirteen states. It is submitted that the
Kentucky case can be supported only by adding to Article V ". . . unless rejected by more than one-fourth of the states". Concededly this
cannot be done.
The Kentucky Court's analogy between an offer to enter Into a
contract and the proposal of an amendment by Congress to the states,
seems to fail for want of similarity between the subjects dealt with
by those two conceptions. The contract offer arises from the everchanging expectations of the business world, and is accordingly shortlived. The proposed constitutional amendment has its origin in the
needs of a nation, expressed through its representatives, and is undoubtedly entitled to more mature consideration. It would seem that
a proposed amendment should be held to be before the states so long
as the exigencies exist which prompted the action of Congress in proposing the amendment,' the current social, political, and financial
structure receiving consideration. Furthermore, it is submitted that
the action or inaction of the various state legislatures over a period
of time, though admittedly indicative, should not be determinative
of the public view as to the necessity of the amendment." The Supreme
6
Court has said:" "We conclude that the fair inference or implication
from Article V is that the ratification must be within some reasonable
time after the proposal." The determination of what is a reasonable
time thus does not seem to warrant the analogy drawn from contract
law.
The question as to plaintiffs' capacity to sue was lost on appeal for
failure to file a special demurrer." However, should the United States
Supreme Court, for any one of several good reasons, desire to avoid
a decision on the validity of the ratification in question, it seems that
"ICf, Jameson, Constitutional Conventions (4th ed., 1887), 585.
"The attempt of Congress to solve the child labor problem under
the commerce clause was declared unconstitutional in Hammer v.
Likewise an attempt under the
Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
taxing power, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
Considering this together with the agitation over the child labor
amendment since its proposal, the Kansas Court held invalid a contention that the proposed amendment has lost its potency by old age.
The Kansas legislative rejection took place in 1925, the ratification In
1937. Coleman v. Miller, supra, n. 7.
"'Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 375 (1921).
The Kentucky Court's reasoning from the decision in Dillon v.
Gloss, sustaining a Congressional limitation of seven years within
which the Twentieth and Twenty-first amendments could be adopted,
is not convincing, in reaching the conclusion that seven years
is regarded by Congress as being a reasonable time within which the
states must act. Logically the absence of a limitation clause in the
proposed child labor amendment would seem to indicate Congressional
opinion that seven years is not a reasonable time.
:11L. & N. R. R. v. Herndon's Admr., 126 Ky. 589, 104 S. W. 732
(1907); Kentucky Codes Ann. (Carroll, 1927), Sec. 92-2.
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such action would be possible on the theory of plaintiffs' lack of
interest sufficient to maintain a suit.18
It seems that counsel for appellees in the Kentucky case were
correct in their contention9 that since the governor's certification to
the Secretary of State of the United States is fait accompli, the case
is moot to the extent that the court can grant no effective relief, even
though it should proceed under the local Declaratory Judgments Law.Y
The certification is merely evidentiary, and it would seem that the
validity of the ratification does not depend upon the certificationi
since the action of the state legislature might well be proven in some
other manner. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether interference by
the court with an essentially legislative process can be countenanced
under the doctrine of separation of powers.2 Nor would it seem that
mandamus would lie against the United States Secretary of State to
compel him to announce a rejection, since the statute under which
he acts imposes no such duty upon him.P
As heretofore pointed out, it seems that Congress by its action
has treated the question as to the effect of a prior rejection upon the
power to subsequently ratify, as being political in nature. The absence
of decisions on this point may well be the result of a feeling on the
part of attorneys and prospective litigants that the question is not a
proper one for judicial determination. The principle that the courts
will not decide political questions has been applied in a number of
situations, -* and has been set out in varying language.20 Political ques1

'Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934), pp. 26-62; see note
(1937), 37 Col. L. Rev. 1201, 1202, where it is cogently suggested that
". . in view of the uncertainty of ratification by the requisite number of states and the fact that the amendment itself does not limit,
regulate or prohibit child labor, but only gives Congress such powers,
it is highly unlikely that any plaintiff could show that the threatened
injury was reasonably certain and impending." See also State of Ohio
v. Cox, 257 Fed. 334 (S. D. Ohio, 1919), denying relief in a suit to
enjoin a governor of a state from submitting a proposed amendment
to a state legislature, on the ground that plaintiff failed to show an
Impending injury since there was no assurance that the amendment
would ever be adopted.
1 08 S. W. (2d) 1024, 1034 (1937).
2 Kentucky Codes Ann. (Carroll, 1927), Secs. 637, et seq.
"U. S. ex rel. Widenmann v. Colby, 265 Fed. 998 (App. D. C., 1920),
affd. 257 U. S. 619 (1921).
220'Reilly v. Mills, 30 Colo. 362, 70 Pac. 322 (1902).
See Note (1937), 37 Col. L. Rev. 1201, 1203: "In order to attack
the validity of an amendment, it seems necessary to wait until its
apparent ratification. Thus this case [Wise v. Chandler] seems to be
no more than an advisory opinion to the United States Secretary of
State."
5 U. S. C. A. title 5, sec. 160.
Supra, n. 9.
3 Cf. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal
Courts (1924), 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485. See also Dodd, Non-Enforcible
Provisions of Constitutions (1931), 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54, 84; Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924), 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338; Finkel-
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tions would seem to be those committed to other than judicial organs
of government, not in terms excluding judicial control, but with respect
to issues so distinctly political in character that a court should regard
it as improper to seek to exercise control.n Essentially it seems that
the action of a state legislature in passing upon a proposed constitutional amendment is governed by considerations of public policy and
expediency, and may be political per se. At any rate, the refusal of
the United States Supreme'Court to look behind the certification in
Leser v. Garnett,u and the fact that Congress has heretofore taken
upon itself the task of determining such questions,2 lend weight to a
position that the Kentucky Court decided a political question in the
principal case.
It is submitted that the Kentucky case" cannot be supported
(1) becausd historical precedent, reason, and authority show that a
rejection of a proposed amendment cannot preclude a subsequent valid
ratification, (2) a fortiori rejection by more than one-fourth of the
states cannot operate to withdraw the amendment from the states,
(3) the proposed amendment was still before the states, no reasonable
time having passed since its proposal, (4) the decision was gratuitous,
certification of the ratification being fait accompli and merely evidentiary, and the Secretary of State of the United States not being
subject to mandamus, and (5) the question is one primarily political,
and therefore not properly subject to judicial determination.
STEVE W11Trr.

HOMESTEADS-INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT IN ASYLUM OR
PENITENTIARY AS CONSTITUTING AN ABANDONMENT.
In a recent Kentucky case,' the Court of Appeals handed down a
decision to the effect that a homestead acquired under the homestead
laws was not abandoned by enforced confinement in the penitentiary.
stein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation (1925), 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 221; Weston, Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296.
03 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States (1929),
1326; see also Dodd, supra, n. 24; Weston, supra, n. 24.
"Dodd, Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions (1931), 80
U. Pa. L. Rev. 54, 85.
258 U. S. 130 (1922).
Supra, n. 9.
nWise, et al. v. Chandler, et al., 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024
(1937).
1 Clolinger v. Callahan, 204 Ky. 33, 263 S. W. 700 (1924)-Defendant
and his son were convicted of killing A, and sent to the penitentiary.
A's widow and children sued defendant under Sec. 4, Ky. Stat., and
garnisheed B bank in which defendant had some money. A alleged
that the money was the proceeds from the sale of his homestead. Held,
defendant had the right to sell his homestead and reinvest the proceeds in another homestead, and his homestead rights were not abandoned by his enforced confinement in prison.

